Professor Fred Eidlin (Political Science, University of Guelph, University of Tartu, Charles University Prague, and the Czech University of Life Sciences) will present in our colloquium on Friday, February 17 from 16:30. Professor Eidlin will be presenting on The Pitfall of Reification and the Reality of Social Things. Everybody interested is invited to participate.
Abstract:
Hypostatization, (reification in one of its many senses) or the fallacy of misplaced concreteness refers to an abstraction being “treated as if it were a concrete, real event, or physical entity.” Hypostatization has occurred when concepts, frameworks, and theories freeze into pictures of reality that cannot be shaken by reality.
There is a natural psychological tendency to assume that every word in language refers to something outside of language. Beliefs about the reality of the things of nature, such as gravity, heat, kinetic force, stones, and water, are usually unproblematic even though, as Kant demonstrated, these beliefs must involve an element of interpretation. Natural scientists are rarely concerned by the doubts of philosophers as to whether a real world exists. It is easy to grasp how the things existing in the natural world can kick back at the hypotheses scientists attempt to impose, and render them problematic.
It is understandable that social scientists also tend to view the concepts they use, like political system, elite, social class, interest group, bureaucracy, and capitalism existing as do stones, trees, and thunderstorms. This commonsense naive realist view of a reality existing independently of our knowledge has deep roots in the human psyche and in language. Few doubt the existence of a social world that can sometimes shatter our false beliefs about it. Yet it remains unclear just what it is that might kick back at the hypotheses social scientists make about it. When social scientists set about to study things like governments, markets, or power, they must have some idea of the nature of the things they wish to research. They make assumptions about the things they intend to investigate and these assumptions play a crucial role in determining what kinds of information to gather and how to gather it. Yet when the notions of social reality underlying social science research are scrutinized, it becomes clear how tenuous their representation can be.
If there is no clear sense of what is “out there” in the real world, concepts tend to create worlds of their own without protest from reality. Facts can always be found that fit the concepts. When a clear notion of social reality is present, that reality can kick back and shatter propositions that are made about it. This reduces the potential for hypostatization.
This paper will argue that a clear sense of social reality is usually missing in social science research, and that accounts for the widespread tendency to hypostatize. It will attempt to develop a remedial approach to hypostatization by suggesting ways of developing an adequate, practical ontology of the social. Words are not simply labels for things. Improving our sense of real social world is the only effective means to combat reification. Research seeks to discover concrete sources of orderliness in social reality that can serve as objective constraints on the hypotheses the research seeks to impose.
